INTRODUCTION
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute provides the International Criminal Court (ICC) with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In accordance with general principles of criminal law, however, the ICC is unable to prosecute anyone for aggression until the crime is precisely defined. The 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference failed to reach agreement on a definition of aggression for the ICC's purposes. It also failed to reach agreement on conditions for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime. Assuredly, aggression is taken to be a crime under customary international law to which
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risdiction. The 2008 Discussion paper suggests several alternatives for the exercise of jurisdiction. The procedure for the entry into force of any amendment to the Rome Statute also remains unresolved. The definitional consensus that has emerged is grounded on the assumption that a narrow definition of aggression stands a more realistic chance of securing state approval. Three characteristics animate this definitional consensus and contribute to its narrowness: (1) that state action is central to the crime; (2) that acts of aggression involve interstate armed conflict; and (3) that criminal responsibility only attaches to very top political or military leaders. The 2008 Discussion paper proposes a new Article 8 bis to the Rome Statute that defines the crime of aggression as follows (footnotes omitted):
(1) For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; Despite the pragmatic attraction and political soundness of proceeding conservatively, however, the opportunity to define the crime of aggression for the purposes of a permanent international justice institution also presents a moment for out-of-the-box thinking. In my remarks, I hope to contribute to this thinking by offering a lesson from the past, raising a concern for the present, and asking a question for the future. Principally, I suggest an expansion in the scope of the crime of aggression, both in terms of the impugned acts as well as in terms of who can be prosecuted. I draw from two examples of crimes against the peace prosecutions in the wake of the Second World War that have received scant attention in the Special Working Group. I also draw from the nature of contemporary threats to transnational stability, security, sovereignty, and human rights interests. In my opinion, many of these threats depart from the classic model of interstate armed conflict.
Mine is a normative project. It is not one that is principally concerned with pragmatics. This does not mean, however, that I am oblivious to the considerable resources that have been invested in consolidating a consensus regarding the definition of aggression. I recognize that discussions regarding the contours of the crime of aggression have occurred off-and-on for many decades. The reality is that a narrow understanding of the crime seems to be what negotiators want and constitutes shared common ground. That said, nothing precludes codification of the pre-existing consensus while actors within and/or outside of the Rome Statute framework push, either collaterally or subsequently, for the scope of the crime of aggression to expand in a manner that more accurately reflects the interests that criminalization purports to promote as well as the deeply collective nature of the crime. The following sequence concerns me: (1) the Special Working Group proposes a narrow crime of aggression; (2) the Rome Statute is amended to include this narrow crime; (3) the Special Working Group packs up its tent; and (4) the conversation about what exactly aggression should proscribe simply loses momentum and ends. Such an outcome, which arises from a 2009] THE PUSH TO CRIMINALIZE AGGRESSION 295 push to codify, might compromise the longer-term expressive value and effective legitimacy of the crime of aggression to future generations, especially in the developing world.
I. BACKGROUND
The Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals (IMTs) were the first to criminalize crimes against peace and aggressive war and attribute individual criminal responsibility therefore. Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg IMT Statute (the London Charter, August 8, 1945) criminalized the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing."
5 The Allies included this crime in the IMT's jurisdiction despite the fact that, at the time, there was "considerable doubt about the customary basis for charges of aggressive war."
6 That said, the Nuremberg IMT dismissed the retroactivity argument. It endeavored to demonstrate that crimes against the peace had been part of customary international law prior to 1939. 7 The Nuremberg IMT emphasized the preexisting nature of the crime as reflecting treaty law that emerged in the wake of the First World War, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 8 The Nuremberg IMT went so far as to call aggressive war the "supreme international crime."
9 It convicted 12 defendants on charges of conspiracy to wage aggressive war (Count I) or crimes against peace (Count II) (8 defendants 5 Article 5(a) of the Charter for the Tokyo IMT (Jan. 19, 1946) proscribed crimes against the peace in a manner that was differently phrased in places but essentially identical to the Nuremberg IMT's provision. 6 ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 242 (2005) . Prior to the London Charter, a number of international instruments had referred to aggression as a crime. Some of these were not ratified. Others were non-binding "soft law." The one instrument with the greatest normative force was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Kellogg 10 cases referenced the existence of an aggressive war, but did not actually charge the crime. In I.G. Farben, 24 highlevel industrial officers were charged inter alia with aggressive war. All were acquitted because they were found merely to have aided the war effort instead of planning and leading it. Krupp involved 12 industrialists. The defense filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on insufficient evidence, which was granted. In the High Command case, 14 defendants (13 generals and one admiral) were charged with crimes against the peace. One defendant committed suicide during the proceedings, and all of the remaining thirteen were acquitted of this charge insofar as they were found not to be operating on the policy-making level. 11 In the Ministries case, 17 of 21 defendants (high-level officials in the government or Nazi Party) were charged with crimes against the peace. The Tribunal initially convicted five and acquitted nine of the 14 defendants who went to trial (the Tribunal earlier had dismissed the charges against 3 defendants). Following a request for correc- the nation and the common soldier is the boundary between the criminal and the excusable participation in the waging of an aggressive war by an individual engaged in it." Id. In order to convict for aggressive war, there must be proof of actual knowledge that an aggressive war is intended and that, if launched, it will be an aggressive war; there also must be proof that "the possessor of such knowledge, after he acquires it shall be in a position to shape or influence the policy that brings about its initiation or its continuance after initiation, either by furthering, or by hindering or preventing it." Id. at 68. In the German High Command trial, eleven defendants were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to terms ranging from two years to life. Id. at 1. tion of any alleged errors of fact or law, the Tribunal reversed two of the convictions but affirmed the other three. 12 Finally, in the Roechling case in the French Zone of Occupation, the Supreme Military Government Court overturned the conviction for crimes against the peace that had been entered by the General Tribunal.
Numerous developments have since consolidated the place of aggression in international law. The paragraphs that follow survey some of these developments. Resolution 3314 eliminates justifications for aggression (art. 5(1)) and, in article 5(2), states that: "A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility." Article 5(2) underscores the dual nature of aggression-namely, as crime as well as delict. A war of aggression, in which participation triggers individual criminal responsibility (and, presumably, state responsibility), differs from aggression generally, which engages only state responsibility. The use of armed force must be of utmost gravity to entail individual criminal responsibility under international law. 15 Nina Jørgensen observes that: "In Article 5(2) the General Assembly confirmed a distinction between wars of aggression, which were considered to have a criminal status, and other acts of aggression short of war. All acts of aggression are international delicts 12 Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, supra note 10, at 56. 13 For a much more comprehensive discussion of these developments, see Bassiouni and Ferencz, supra note 1. 14 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 8. [Vol. 41:291 entailing state responsibility." 16 There also is a third distinction, namely between aggression (whether subject to penal responsibility or state responsibility), on the one hand, and the unlawful use of force, on the other. Not all instances of the unlawful use of force constitute aggression. According to Bassiouni and Ferencz, the Security Council has never relied on Resolution 3314 to label any armed attack as being tantamount to aggression. 19 I examine these two cases insofar as they offer some insight regarding what crimes against the peace/aggression prosecutions might look like (and what they might achieve) when they involve perpetrators below the top military or political leadership. These judgments pre-date the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMT judgments. However, they explicitly or implicitly reference the London and Tokyo Charters, along with other international legal instruments, and thereby underscore the influence of international materials on the substance of national proceedings.
A. Takashi Sakai
On August 29, 1946, the Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defense in Nanking convicted Takashi Sakai (1887-1946), a lieutenant general in the Imperial Japanese Army, of crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 20 Sakai was a military commander in China during WWII and in the antecedent JapaneseChinese conflicts. He was involved in the brutal conquest of Hong Kong in 1941 (he also served as Japanese Governor of Hong Kong for a short period). The judgment is somewhat unclear whether Sakai's conviction was
[ The Tribunal found Sakai guilty "of participating in the war of aggression." 21 He also was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity (principally for inciting or permitting his subordinates to commit acts of atrocity). He was sentenced to death and was executed in 1946.
The Chinese Tribunal conducted its process under the terms of the Chinese Rules Governing the Trial of War Criminals. Article I of these Rules identifies the primary source of substantive law for these tribunals to be international law, supplemented by the Rules and the Chinese Penal Code. The Notes on the Sakai Case state that "[t]he Tribunal's verdict on the count of crimes against peace was made with regard, though without express reference, to rules which were explicitly formulated in the latest development of international law in this sphere . . . . [T]he Tribunal's verdict on this count was entirely based upon rules of international law . . . ."
22
The Notes make specific mention of the London Charter, the Tokyo Charter, Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (Article II(1)(A)) (which indicated that responsibility for crimes against the peace is not confined to high State administrators), and Articles I of the Nine Power Treaty and of the KelloggBriand Pact. The Notes also indicate that the Tribunal also relied upon nonaggression treaties that Japan had signed.
Sakai was found guilty of aggression because "he had taken part in the war of aggression against China." 23 According to the Notes: "No further qualifications can be found in the Judgment beyond this point, so that it would seem that, according to the Chinese Tribunal, the accused's liability lay in no other circumstances than in the fact that he had conducted military operations which formed part of a war of aggression." 24 Although the Tribunal found, as a matter of fact, that Sakai "participated in the war on the orders of his Government,"
25 it rejected the defense of following orders as a matter of international as well as Chinese law. According to the Notes, the Tribunal was influenced by the fact that there was a "firmly established rule that to commit crimes upon superior orders, including those of a Government, does not relieve the perpetrator from penal responsibility, but may be 21 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 22 Id. at 3, 7. 23 Id. at 4. 24 Id. 25 Id. at 5.
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taken in mitigation of punishment." 26 Although Sakai was ordered to participate in the aggressive war effort, perhaps somewhat paradoxically the Tribunal also noted that he was "one of the leaders who were instrumental in Japan's aggression in China."
27 That said, his leadership role was not evident in the Tribunal's legal finding that it was Sakai's participation, upon orders, in the war effort that served as the basis for his culpability.
B. Artur Greiser
The Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (sitting in Poznan) convicted Artur Greiser (1897-1946) of a series of extraordinary international crimes, including crimes against the peace, in July 1946. 28 First a member of the Nazi Party, then a Deputy, Greiser became President of the Danzig Senate in the mid 1930's and, ultimately, the Gauleiter (Governor) of the Warthegau, a Polish region attached to the Third Reich following the 1939 invasion of Poland. Greiser served as "one of the leaders of" the Nazi Party in Danzig. 29 Together with other Danzig leaders, and in conspiracy with central Reich authorities, Greiser was alleged to have prepared, directed, and put into effect aggressive measures against Poland. His conduct was alleged to span from 1930 to 1945. While Gauleiter, Greiser "wanted to rid his region of Poles and replace them with Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans). He took away Polish property, placed Polish orphans with 'Aryan' families, terrorized the clergy, and limited cultural and educational programs. From 1939-1945 he kicked out 630,000 Jews and Poles and replaced them with 537,000 ethnic Germans." 30 The notorious Chelmno death camp was under the direct command of SS and Police leadership in the Warthegau which, in turn, acted in cooperation with Greiser. 31 In terms of the substantive law regarding aggression, the Polish Tribunal relied upon international treaties, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the London Charter, and in particular a non-aggression pact signed 26 Id. 27 Id. at 1. 28 between Germany and Poland in 1934. It primarily based itself in municipal Polish law, however, including Polish decrees passed in the wake of the Second World War. In terms of the facts, the Greiser judgment offers an exceptionally detailed account of Nazi aggression against Poland (as well as of Nazi atrocity in Poland).
Greiser raised in his defense that: (1) he opposed the war as an instrument to attain the goals of the Nazi party; (2) he submitted resignations, which were never accepted, on four occasions; (3) he acted upon the express orders of Hitler or Himmler and under the strict supervision of central German authorities; and (4) that he had only a restricted responsibility for general matters of policy. 32 He also sought to advance a claim that neither the ordinary police, nor the Gestapo, nor the S.S. were "ever subordinated to him in any way or measure [but] always took their orders and instructions directly from Berlin, and particularly from Himmler."
33
The Tribunal found him guilty of nearly all charges, including crimes against the peace. It found him to be "one of the chief instruments" in "the gradually unfolding plan for aggressive war on a world scale . . . and especially in Danzig . . . ."
34 It found Greiser "fanatically given over to the idea of a Greater Germany."
35 Although the Tribunal linked Greiser to Hitler in a "conspiratory" sense, it also held that Greiser "successfully carried out the criminal order of his leader."
36 In coming to this latter conclusion, the Tribunal seems to implicitly accept that Greiser was not a policy-maker or high-level leader, but still convicted him for crimes against the peace. Moreover, the Tribunal was minded that superior orders did not serve as a matter of penal theory as a defense to the charges against Greiser, including charges of crimes against the peace. In this regard, the Tribunal adhered to applicable municipal Polish law, where superior orders can only be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Greiser was executed by hanging on July 21, 1946 in public in front of the Warthegau Governor's mansion. In addition, the Tribunal pronounced the loss of public and civic rights, and the forfeiture of all his property.
C. Implications for the Leadership Requirement
The Nuremberg IMT and military tribunals in subsequent proceedings in both the American and French military zones acquitted suspects based on rigorous understandings of the policy-making/leadership requirement to the crime of aggression. However, the Greiser and Sakai cases suggest that not all tribunals were so inclined. It is doubtful whether both defendants (in particular Sakai) would meet the policy-maker requirement subsequently elucidated in the American Military Tribunal's High Command judgment. Consequently, the Special Working Group, insofar as it believes the leadership requirement to be of great qualificatory relevance, would be well advised explicitly to underscore its importance to the crime of aggression. It looks like the Special Working Group will pursue a differentiated approach to the crime of aggression. This means that the crime of aggression is treated in the same way as the other crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. 38 If this path is pursued, it should follow that the definition of the crime, the elements of the crime, and/or general principles of law in the Rome Statute (e.g. Article 25) contain a clear leadership requirement, else a broader array of perpetrators may become implicated. The 2008 Discussion paper adheres to this advice in terms of its proposed new Articles 8 bis(1) and Article 25(3bis). 39 In the absence of such a clearly stiputhat this judgment is an instance of how "the illegal nature of aggressive war has been related to the principle that the plea of superior orders can only be effective if the orders were legal or if the accused was not aware, and could not reasonably be expected to be aware, of their illegality." 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 149 (1949) . 38 The differentiated approach contrasts with monistic approaches, where the crime of aggression is treated separately from the general principles of individual criminal responsibility within the Rome Statute. The differentiated approach is ascendant. That said, the leadership requirement, conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, and the interface with admissibility render the crime of aggression, even if the differentiated approach were pursued, somewhat anomalous in terms of the operation of the Rome Statute. 39 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 3. The leadership requirement at the IMT largely was jurisprudential, in that "[i]n the Nuremberg Charter the range of persons liable to prosecution and punishment for crimes against peace is defined in the first and last paragraph of Article 6. It includes any person implicated in its commission whether as an individual or a member of organizations, or as a leader, organizer, instigator or accomplice. The current conversation at the Special Working Group thereby continues to frame an act of aggression quite conservatively. There are important instrumental reasons for proceeding in this manner. One reason is that, simply put, proceeding conservatively offers an easier path to consensus. The ground is settled at the core; it is considerably more controversial on the perimeter. The ICC's work already may be plagued by enough controversy. 43 Why add more, especially when the Special Working Group has effected concrete progress in the direction of defining the crime of aggression? 44 Theodor Meron, in the United States' statement regarding the crime of aggression, underscores how the "prudence displayed in Rome has provIn order to respect important principles of legality, however, any expansion of the acts constitutive of aggression should proceed through the specific and explicit inclusion of offenses in the Rome Statute language, in particular for non-customary offenses. Proceeding along these lines would minimize the potential for judicial activism and overreach, while also discouraging vagueness challenges by potential defendants. See generally Kenneth S. Gallant, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 407 (2009) ("[I]t is extremely difficult to see how a definition of aggression that included acts other than the planning, ordering, or leading of attacks by one sovereign state on territory within the jurisdiction of another sovereign state for the purpose of conquest -essentially the World War II-type of situation -could be considered a current customary international criminal law definition of aggression as an individual crime.") 42 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 4. 43 For example, the Prosecutor's application for an arrest warrant for Sudanese President al-Bashir has prompted new conversations among several permanent members of the United Nations Security Council about the possibility of a deferral under article 16 of the Rome Statute. 44 Assuredly, to varying degrees consensus has eluded the Special Working Group among a number of other important areas, such as: the amendment process, trigger mechanism, conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, whether a determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression has occurred is a threshold determination or necessarily binds the ICC Prosecutor or the judges, and the delimitation of what, exactly, constitute exceptions to aggression (i.e. humanitarian armed intervention). This Article does not consider these issues. It is possible that controversy regarding these issues would be exacerbated were the 46 Moreover, simply defining a crime of aggression-however narrow-for the purpose of the ICC would represent a major step forward in establishing aggression as part of international legal practice and in taking a spirited stand against the horrors of "unauthorized war-making."
47 Discussing and codifying law beyond the parameters of custom may be controversial and may chip away at the ICC's legitimacy, at least in the short term.
That said, I wonder if international criminal lawyers should think twice about limiting the act to this narrow, conventional proscription. I would like to gently challenge this conventional wisdom by pointing to the dialogic, expressive, and discursive value of a broader conversation regarding acts of aggression. That conversation might begin with the following question: What are the international interests we hope to protect by criminalizing aggression? I posit that there are four such interests: (1) stability, (2) security, (3) human rights, and (4) sovereignty. 48 If we are agreed as to the interests at play, then the question follows whether criminalizing only interstate armed attacks that flagrantly violate the jus ad bellum captures the key stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty challenges that the international community currently faces. I think that the answer to this question is 'no.' Consider the following:
x internal armed conflict; x attacks by states against their own populations/civilians; x non-state actor violence, for example systemic attacks by terrorist groups-such as Al-Qaeda-or by narco-terrorist syndicates; x massive cyber-attacks; and widespread, long-term, severe, and deliberately inflicted environmental harms. Each of these phenomena-to varying degrees-presents major threats to all four protected interests. These threats rival those posed by interstate armed conflict. They are occasioned intentionally by leaders of states or non-state actors. Hence, this category of threats-which I identify as the first category-is readily capable of analogy to the threats proscribed by the Special Working Group's current understanding of the acts constitutive of the crime of aggression. However, the narrow framing of the crime of aggression keeps all of these first-category threats off the discussion table despite the fact that each of them could well cause the kinds of effects normally associated with war among states.
50
I also posit a second category of threats that includes phenomena that are significantly less capable of analogy to either inter-state armed conflict or the first-category threats I list above. I include climate change and public health pandemics among these threats. In the case of climate change, which arises from ordinary human activity, reputable scientists posit that, if left unchecked, its effects might include the submerging of territory underwater (even of entire small island states), the triggering of massive refugee movements, and the exacerbation of desertification. If we assume the accuracy of these scientific predictions, these effects if left unchecked would thereby arise not intentionally but, rather, from willfully blind, negligent, or innocent failure to act by a number of actors, including states (for example, in terms of curbing greenhouse gas emissions). I flag these second-category threats en passant insofar as in certain regions of the world the sovereignty, security, human rights, and stability effects of unchecked climate change upon affected populations are significant in light of the great difficulty among populations to adapt thereto. 51 In the end, however, it seems most (or limited) centralized command and control structure, deploy power in a deeply asymmetrical context, and are composed of subordinate members who operate with considerable independence. For a discussion of the security threats posed by non-state actors and environmental threats, see U.S. National Defense Strategy (June 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf.
Although discussions regarding the scope of an act of aggression are longstanding, many of the threats discussed in the Part are newer entrants to formal international lawmaking discourse. Accordingly, many have not yet been comprehensively contemplated within the framework of aggression and thereby represent some discontinuity with prior discussions. Assuredly, individual participation in some of the enumerated first-category threats may be captured by other crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction or by transnational criminal law. This overlap also arises in the case of criminalizing interstate armed attacks, insofar as it is highly probable that such conduct would also involve the commission of atrocity crimes as proscribed by the ICC. 51 Are these second-category threats the kinds of phenomena that ought to fall within the definition of "acts" of aggression and, hence, for which penal or civil responsibility ought to flow? There are self-evident reasons not to extend responsibility in this direction. First, the 308
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In the case of these first-category threats, although the Special Working Group's conservative framing may facilitate consensus, it may simultaneously sacrifice a forthright dialogue about the major peace and order challenges faced by the global community, in particular by developing nations. Many of these challenges do not flow from international armed conflict (though they may in turn create conditions that encourage international armed conflict). It remains unclear whether, as a matter of practice, interstate armed attacks today singularly constitute the gravest and most widespread violations of collective security interests. As the nature of the threats to collective interests shifts, might the law shift as well? If so, might the direction of the change be one that expands, instead of contracts, what, exactly, constitutes an act of aggression?
Alternately, if such a dialogic enlargement simply were unworkable, one response might be for the Special Working Group to contemplate expanding the concept of the unlawful use of force to cover these sorts of threats, with consequent state, organizational, or tortious civil responsibility On the other hand, normatively couching these threats in the language of international criminal law might inject some urgency to regulatory enforcement and treaty negotiations, while also enhancing administrative supervision in these areas more generally. If the Security Council is determined to be a trigger mechanism for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the existence of a broader definition of potential acts of aggression also could enrich the kinds of conversations within the Security Council regarding what, exactly, constitutes aggression, threats to, or breaches of the peace. That said, it remains contested and unclear whether climate change and other collective action problems are wellserved by being framed as breaches of the global trust instead of as regulatory concerns. Perhaps the security implications of inaction on climate change and public health are better left to issue-specific regulatory frameworks that mix sticks and carrots or to aspirational human rights frameworks. But it would seem more convincing to arrive at such a conclusion after having carefully considered other ways to frame state decisions not to act in regard to these phenomena, including proscription by international criminal law, and having discarded these other frames. look to the Rome Statute definition for guidance-meaning that now might be an opportune time for progressive development of the law regarding aggression and unlawful use of force. Although the principal purpose of the Rome Statute is to delimit the jurisdiction of the ICC, it also plays a much larger law reform, discursive, and codification function, the potential of which the Special Working Group certainly recognizes. Assuredly, there is another side to this debate. For one, this entire conversation may be practically futile insofar as there is no indication of any will in the Special Working Group negotiations to transcend interstate armed acts as the singular kinds of acts of aggression. 55 Furthermore, even in cases of first-category threats, what I propose would likely expand the Rome Statute's definition of aggression beyond that found in customary international law, thereby running afoul of Meron's sage advice (and also diminishing the likelihood that the United States ever joins the ICC). If the Special Working Group casts the first-category threats I have identified as aggression, perhaps states would respond through backlash and fears of overlegalization, thereby occasioning withdrawal from a variety of international regimes (e.g. those proscribing terrorism or addressing jus in bello in non-international armed conflict) instead of incentivizing state adhesion to these regimes. Too broadly expanding the category of aggression might place the crime at odds with the depraved moral gravity of the other crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction, such as genocide and crimes against humanity. In response, the first-category threats do seem to share similar moral gravity and, certainly, similar intentionality of conduct. When it comes to questions whether a state can commit aggression against its own people, or whether non-state actors can commit aggression, or whether military deployments other than classic use of force (i.e. cyber attacks) could constitute aggression, issues of causation, attribution, and moral responsibility are analogous to those implicated by the illegal interstate use of force.
If the purpose of the criminalization of aggression is to protect security, stability, sovereignty, and human rights interests, crimping the conversation by focusing only on the core prohibitions that emerged six decades ago leaves a significant array of serious threats outside the framework of international criminal law or the law of state responsibility for serious breaches of erga omnes obligations. As such, amid its instrumental benefits, the path chosen by the Special Working Group also triggers opportunity costs. This path effectively pursues a least common denominator approach codify this crime may leave unchecked the ability of their governments to launch them into aggressive wars. that represents only the base-line that all state-parties accept. Although there is considerable value in getting a core definition in place, there also are plentiful reasons for looking beyond. Incidentally, these two goals are not mutually exclusive. There can be more than one lane ahead.
IV. QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: PUNISHING THE AGGRESSOR
International criminal tribunals, along with their constitutive instruments, evoke a number of justifications for why they punish perpetrators of extraordinary international crimes. These justifications include retribution, deterrence, and expressivism; and, on a subaltern level, rehabilitation, reintegration, reconciliation, and incapacitation. To some degree, these justifications inform the aggravating and mitigating factors that affect the quantum of sentence. I have elsewhere argued that international criminal law experiences considerable difficulty in attaining retributive or deterrent goals, but that it is somewhat more successful in operationalizing its expressive aspirations. 56 I provide the following working definition of expressivism:
The expressivist punishes to strengthen faith in rule of law among the general public, as opposed to punishing simply because the perpetrator deserves it or because potential perpetrators will be deterred by it. Expressivism also transcends retribution and deterrence in claiming as a central goal the crafting of historical narratives, their authentication as truths, and their pedagogical dissemination to the public. 57 What is more, "[f]rom an expressivist perspective, punishment proactively embeds the normative value of law within the community." 58 The purpose of this Part is not to revisit the general debate over the role of sentencing and punishment in international criminal law; nor is it to unpack whether the sentences actually awarded by international punishing institutions attain the avowed aspirations. 59 Rather, my purpose is to ask: what are the penological objectives of punishing aggression and sentencing an aggressor? Resolution 3314, for its part, raises deterrence as a punitive rationale. 60 Given the difficulty that international punishment for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity experiences in generally deterring such crimes, it simply may not be realistic to expect that things would be different when it comes to aggression. For the sake of argument, however, let's assume that would-be aggressors would in fact be deterred. In that case, a new set of concerns arises-namely, whether we are deterring the right kind of use of force. In other words, do we necessarily wish to deter humanitarian armed intervention or on-the-ground deployments that could decelerate (or even prevent) genocide or crimes against humanity? Noah Weisbord echoes the warning that criminalizing aggression "may deter the wrong sort of violent actions, actions that reduce human suffering such as the unauthorized use of force to prevent genocide." 61 In response, the Special Working Group may find it prudent to except bona fide humanitarian actions from the scope of aggression.
On a broader note, should the penological rationales for the crime of aggression parallel those of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes? Is aggression of a different offense-gravity than these other crimes?
62 Is aggression still the "supreme international crime" 63 (in the words of the Nuremberg IMT) and, if so, should it be punished more harshly than the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute? That said, even the Nuremberg sentences do not support this line of deduction. At Nuremberg, one defendant was convicted only of aggression charges (counts I and II) and several were convicted only of war crimes or crimes against humanity (counts III and IV). Hess, convicted only on counts I and II, was given a life sentence; the six defendants convicted only on counts III and/or IV were given four death sentences (Bormann [in absentia], Frank, Kaltenbrunner, and Streicher) and two sentences of 20 years' imprisonment (Speer and von Schirach). Moreover, insofar as genocide has vinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of deterring a potential aggressor . . . ."). Although not explicitly stated as such, the kind of deterrence contemplated by Resolution 3314 appears to be general deterrence. See also Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute 18 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (noting that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor "has recognized the importance of deterrence, adopting it as the 'third principle' guiding its prosecutorial strategy"). 61 Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT'L L. J. 161, 220 (2008) . 62 International criminal law has distinguished genocide and crimes against humanity from armed conflict (even though generally these atrocity crimes arise during times of armed conflict) and has constructed them as something that can transcend or run independently from a war effort. Aggression, on the other hand, is the criminalization of the war effort itself. Accordingly, it is a deeply collective crime (so, too, is genocide and crimes against humanity, although there may be some important differences among these crimes as to their collective nature). 63 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra note 6, at 186 ("To initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole").
